GBThe Crown Estate Offshore Wind Leasing Round 5 for the Celtic Sea
Also known as: The Crown Estate Offshore Wind Leasing Round 5, Offshore Wind Leasing Round 5, Leasing Round 5, Round 5, Crown Estate Round 5, The Crown Estate Round 5, Celtic Sea Round 5, Celtic Sea Leasing Round 5, Celtic Sea Offshore Wind Leasing Round 5, Floating Offshore Wind Leasing Round 5, TCE Round 5, Round 5 Celtic Sea
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R5 is The Crown Estate's first commercial-scale Celtic Sea floating offshore wind leasing round. It followed Crown Estate Round 4 in broad leasing logic but replaced R4's daily sealed cycles with an online ascending clock auction with Exit Bids and an explicit one-PDA-per-bidder cap. Programme-level support investments such as pre-consent surveys and the NESO grid connection plan reduced developer risk without being modelled as award components. Market context at launch was shaped by the UK's 50 GW offshore wind target, 5 GW floating target, AR5's zero-offshore-wind outcome, the announced intention to unlock a further 12 GW in the Celtic Sea, and contemporaneous comparison with ScotWind in a different jurisdiction.
3
Ascending · multi-round
agreement for lease + wind farm lease + transmission lease
4.5 GW
—
GBP 350/MW/yr
10 years
CPI
—
—
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Failure to meet AfL milestone deadlines, as extended, gives The Crown Estate a right to terminate the AfL; analogous termination rights apply under Wind Farm and Transmission Leases if construction milestones are not met.
Wind Farm Agreement for Lease (AfL) for an awarded PDA. The AfL gives the project company the seabed-rights framework for the site during the option period and is the main post-auction legal instrument for progressing surveys, consenting, and contractualised social-value and environmental obligations.
Wind Farm Lease callable under the AfL for construction and operation of the offshore wind project.
Transmission AfL/lease package associated with the PDA, callable if required once the offshore transmission route is identified and approved.
→ Failure to meet the milestone deadline, as extended, gives The Crown Estate a right to terminate the Wind Farm AfL.
→ Failure to meet the milestone deadline, as extended, gives The Crown Estate a right to terminate the Wind Farm AfL.
→ Failure to meet the milestone deadline, as extended, gives The Crown Estate a right to terminate the Wind Farm AfL.
→ If the project company has not started or completed construction by the specified dates, The Crown Estate may terminate the Wind Farm Lease.
→ If the project company has not started or completed construction by the specified dates, The Crown Estate may terminate the Transmission Lease.
Late delivery: Failure to meet AfL milestone deadlines, as extended, gives The Crown Estate a right to terminate the AfL; analogous termination rights apply under Wind Farm and Transmission Leases if construction milestones are not met.
Annual option fee payable under the Wind Farm AfL, calculated as the bidder's Option Fee Bid multiplied by PDA Maximum Capacity. The observed £350/MW/year uniform outcome is captured in the auction results rather than as an ex ante fixed design parameter.
Trigger: Begins on entry into the Wind Farm AfL; immediate post-auction payment mechanics fund the first year before AfL entry.
Duration: 10 years
Anchor: fixed year count
Indexation: cpi — Option fees are CPI indexed.
After year 6: 50% reduction — Project Company can demonstrate that an Option Notice would be served under the Wind Farm AfL but for an unavoidable delay in obtaining a key project consent that has been applied for.
Scope: Relevant capacity only.
Stage trigger: Allocation proceeds through the clock auction until each PDA has at most one bidder willing to meet the current auction price.
Online ascending clock auction with Exit Bids. Three PDAs are auctioned simultaneously. In each round a bidder may submit one binding Option Fee Bid for one PDA only, and no bidder may ultimately secure more than one PDA.
Reserve: — Auction prices escalate from an opening auction price set by The Crown Estate, but the public corpus does not establish the opening price.
Stop: The auction ends when there is no more than one bidder willing to meet the current auction price for each PDA in a given round.
Selection: In each round, each bidder may place one bid for one PDA at that PDA's current auction price.
Disclosure: Previous-round information, current bid counts by PDA, and next-round PDA price increments are disclosed between rounds.
No entity, or member of its wider corporate group, may have an interest in more than one bidder at any stage of Round 5, whether as a sole bidder or as part of a consortium.
Mandatory and discretionary exclusion criteria at PQQ, including bribery and fraud, tax compliance, money laundering, and other grave professional misconduct.
Bidder must demonstrate relevant offshore development, offshore construction or delivery, and major-infrastructure consenting experience.
Bidder must satisfy the audited-financial standing tests used in Round 5, including Revenue Ratio, Net Assets Balance, and at least one of Operating Profit Margin, Interest Cover Ratio, or Current Ratio in each evaluated accounting period; guarantor rules apply where used.
Bidder must provide the required red-flag feedback on draft legal agreements and proceed on the required legal-agreement basis through the tender process.
Bidder must provide compliant HSE management arrangements and relevant disclosures.
Bidder must identify consenting risks and mitigations and provide the required stakeholder-engagement approach.
Bidder must provide the required engineering-risk assessment for delivery of the project.
Bidder must provide the required project schedule and organisational-structure evidence for delivery.
Bidder must confirm the project will remain within the design envelope used for the plan-level HRA.
Bidder must identify primary and alternative ports and provide evidence of in-principle availability, access rights, and ability to support the project within the option period.
Bidder must commit that at least 3.5% of all new workers involved in Round 5 developments are apprentices.
Bidder must commit that at least 10% of new workers aged 19-24 involved in Round 5 developments are, or have very recently been, NEETs.
Bidder's Maximum Level of Cash (MLOC) must be at least £45m, demonstrated from cash and cash equivalents plus committed undrawn borrowing facilities; it is used both as a qualification threshold and as a cap on the maximum auction bid.
Method: quantitative formula
Unit: GBP/MW/year
No revenue-support instrument. Revenue comes from downstream offtake contracts, merchant markets, or bilateral PPAs.
Legal basis: Crown Estate Act 1961; Procurement Act 2023 section 43 provides the legal basis for the later linked direct-award process for the unallocated PDA.
MLOC ≥ (3 × Option Fee Bid × 1,500 MW) + (1.5 × £30m annual development costs)
Procurement Act 2023 section 43
Trigger: Post-auction switch to direct award after unsuccessful tender outcome: no tender received for PDA 2 at the June 2025 auction close.
Price: Observed outcome matched the auction-awarded PDAs at £350/MW/year, but public sources do not establish a formal ex ante price-matching rule.
UK CfD Allocation Rounds for floating offshore wind; commercial dependency rather than legal prerequisite.
| Winner | Site/Lot | Category | Capacity | Price | Total Value | Delivery | Term | Mechanism | Signed | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equinor | — | One of the first two Round 5 site awards | 1,500 MW | GBP 350/MW/yr | — | — | — | auction clearing | — | offered and signed |
| Gwynt Glas | — | One of the first two Round 5 site awards | 1,500 MW | GBP 350/MW/yr | — | — | — | auction clearing | — | offered and signed |
| Ocean Winds | third site | Third site direct award | 1,500 MW | GBP 350/MW/yr | — | — | — | subsequent direct award | — | — |